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Morley v. Post, 84 Colo. 41. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Glasson v. Bowen, 84 Colo. 57. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Radovich v. Douglas, 84 Colo. 149. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Towles v. Meador, 84 Colo. 547. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Walker v. Hunter, 86 Colo. 483. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Leighton v. People 90 Colo. 106. Conviction of criminal libel reversed.
Bearman v. People, 91 Colo. 486. Conviction of criminal libel affirmed.
Bereman v. Power Publishing Co., 93 Colo. 581. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Kendall v. Lively, 94 Colo. 483. Slanler judgment for plaintiff for $475 affirmed.
Biggerstaff v. Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194 Slander judgment for defendant reversed.
Knapp v. Post Publishing Co., 111 Colo. 492. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Lininger v. Knight, decided Jan. 15, 1951, 1950-51 CBA Advance Sheet 186 (No. 9 for
Jan. 20). Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Summary
Civir, LIBELS:
.Judgment against defendant reversed-14
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed-7
CRIMINAL LIBELS:
Judgment against plaintiff reversed-10
Judgment affirmed-1
Judgment for defendant affirmed-7
Judgment reversed-1

DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
BY PUBLIC CARRIER?
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law

If John Doe departs this life through the negligence of a servant of a public carrier, while that servant is running a locomotive,
must Mary Doe, his wife, elect whether to sue under Section one
(the penal section) of the Colorado wrongful death statute I or

under Sections two and three (the compensatory sections) of that
9tatute, or can she recover damages under each section? The general question, it seems, is this: If the factual situation in a wrong' COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 50, §§ 1-4 (1935). The pertinent provisions of the statute are
as follows :
Section one: Whenever any person shall die from any injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent of any officer, agent, servant or employee, whilst running, conducting or managing any locomotive, car or train
of cars, or of the driver of any coach or other public conveyance whilst in charge of
the same as driver, and when any passenger shall die from any injury resulting from
or occasioned by any defect or insufficiency in any railroad or any part thereof, or in
any locomotive or car, or in any stage coach, or other public conveyance, the corporation, individual or individuals in whose employ any such officer, agent, servant, employee, master, pilot, engineer or driver shall be at the time such injury is committed,
or who owns any such railroad, locomotive, car, stage coach or other public conveyance at the time any such Injury is received, and resulting from or occasioned by defect
or insufficiency above described, shall forfeit and pay for every person and passenger
so injured the sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, and not less than three thousand
dollars, which may be sued for and recovered : . . . [Following are designated the persons who have a cause of action under the statute.]
Section two: Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death
had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action for damages notwithstanding the death of the party injured.
Section three : All damages accruing under the last preceding section shall be sued
for and recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in section 1
of this chapter, and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they deem
fair and just, not exceeding five thousand (5,000) dollars, with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties, who may be entitled to sue;
and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any
such wrongful act, neglect or default.
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ful death action is such that it comes within the purview of each
section of the statute, does the plaintiff have but one cause of
action, or does he have two?
In the case of Dood v. Baker,2 Judge Gooding, sitting in the
District Court for the County of Routt, decided that the plaintiff
has two causes of action. On defendant's motion "to dismiss, to
elect, and to sever" the court said:
The question is whether the right of action and remedies under
Section 1 and under Sections 2 and 3, respectively, are exclusive and
in the alternative or are concurrent and cumulative, when the facts
bring plaintiff under both parts.

Judge Gooding held the sections are concurrent and cumulative because: (1) "remedies are cumulative on the face of the law";
and (2) "Where the pleaded facts bring the plaintiff within both
parts, the sections are distinguishable only as to the remedies and
recoveries." Section one imposes a penalty and Sections two and
three provide "something entirely different, compensatory damages."
In Clasen v. Santa Fe Trails Transportation Company 3 Federal District Judge William L. Knous required the plaintiff to
elect the section under which to proceed, stating that if she obtained judgment thereunder, she could then raise the question as
to whether she has a cause of action under the other section also,
and if judgment is in favor of the defendant on the elected section,
then is the time for the court to decide if the entered judgment
is res judicata. The action was settled, however, before trial on
the elected section.

"NEW

CAUSE OF ACTION"

THEORY IN COLORADO

Certain decisions by the Supreme Court of Colorado on our
wrongful death statutes are helpful in attempting to answer the
question. For example, that court has pointed out that since there
was no right of action for damages resulting from wrongful death
at common law, the right exists only by virtue of statute, 4 which,
by the general rule, must be strictly construed. 5 And, on the wrongful death statutes, Colorado has followed the "new cause of action"
theory.6
Perhaps most important of the interpretations, for our purposes, is the consistent holding that Sections two and three are
compensatory, not penal, 7 and, conversely, that Section one is
2 Civil Action No. 2725, decided October 18, 1949.
3Unreported case No. 2949 in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado (1950).
4Hindry v. Holt, 24 Colo. 464. 51 P. 1002 (1897).
:Stowell v. People, 104 Colo. 255, 90 P. 2d 520 (1939).
'Fish v. Lllcy, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P. 2d 930 (1949) (compensatory section) ; Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick, 57 Colo. 90, 213 P. 463 (1914) (penal section).
'Moffat v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892) ; Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo.
465, 30 P. 352 (1892) ; Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 P. 211
(1898).

April, 1951

DICTA

133

penal, not compensatory.8 In speaking of the compensatory section, the court has said that it affords compensation only for the
pecuniary loss which results to the living party entitled to sue
from the death of the deceasedY But in speaking of the other
section, it has been said that the amount of damages to be assessed
thereunder depends "solely upon the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer" and "the fact that recovery may be had under it
without any proof whatever of damages conclusively establishes
that it is penal." 10
In the leading case of Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick,1 1 the court explained the distinction between the sections
in substantially the following language: They are essentially
and diametrically different in their characters, purposes, and
objects. Section one gives a cause of action whether decedent
would have had one or not. Section three gives a cause of action
only when the person injured would have had such a right had
death not ensued. The purpose of Section one is to guard and
protect human life against the fatal consequences of the negligence, unskillfulness, or criminal intent of any officer or servant
of any common carrier under the circumstances detailed in the
statute. The recovery is denominated a forfeiture, and the fact
that it goes to the next of kin cannot be said to affect or change
the character of the provision. Because Section one is penal, it
was held in the Frederick case to be erroneous to allow the plaintiffs to prove damages occasioned by the loss of the services and
support of their son, since the amount of recovery depends solely
on the degree of culpability of the defendant.
In A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Farrow,12 the court further explained the difference between these sections:
. . . the legislature discriminates between common carriers and
other corporations and individuals. They confine section 1 to the former, while section 2 includes the latter. They desired to impose a
different liability upon common carriers from that resting upon all
other persons, and chose this way of doing it.
SUIT MAY BE BROUGHT UNDER EITHER SECTION

In Fredricks v. Denver Tramway Corp.,13 plaintiff was introducing her evidence when the defendant moved she be required
to proceed under Section one, "conceded to be penal," or Section
two, "conceded to be compensatory." She elected to proceed under
Section two, and the action was then dismissed as to the defendants. The dismissal was reversed, the Supreme Court's holding
that a common carrier may be sued under "either" section. This,
8Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick, supra, note 6.
'Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Spencer, supra, note 7.
'o

Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick, supra, note 6.

11Ibid.

6 Colo. 498 (1883).
1"93 Colo. 539, 27 P. 2d 497 (1933).
12
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it seems, is the closest the Supreme Court of Colorado has come
to deciding the point in issue.
The New Mexico court has held there is but one cause of action in the situation in question, and that state's wrongful death
provisions are substantially the same as those of Colorado. The
statute pertaining to the liability of carriers has been construed
to be penal, 14 and it has been held, further, that when one is killed
by a common carrier, the wrongful death action is under the
penal section only, and there cannot be two sections. 15 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Orie L Phillips, relied on the latter decision in again
deciding that the action, in the given situation, is under the penal
section only. 16 It should be noted
that these decisions are contrary
17
to those of the Colorado court.
The interpretation of the Missouri statutes, again in substance
the same as those of Colorado, is that the one section is penal 1I
and the other compensatory. 19 In a decision involving the latter
section, 20 it was held that the plaintiff could elect the section under
which he desires to sue, when the facts fall within both of them,
the same construction as our court applied in Fredricks v. Denver
Tramway Corp.2' The Missouri court has also held that the plaintiff must pray for the damages allowed by the compensatory sec22
tion, and a prayer for damages based on the penal section is error,
an interpretation
similar to that in Denver & Rio Grande R. Co.
23
v. Frederick.
The Missouri court has decided the point in issue, saying,
there was but one cause of action, and the court was correct in telling
the jury, if they found for the plaintiff on one count, to find for the
defendant on the other, as it would not have been proper for the jury
to have found for the plaintiff on both counts and assess damages
accordingly.'

The reasoning behind this conclusion is explained as follows:
To constitute a cause of action, there must be two subjects of
complaint. But in the present case there is but one injury, one subject-matter of complaint-the killing of plaintiff's husband. There
being but one cause of action, there could not be a verdict for causing the death one way, and another verdict for causing the death in
a different way.'
4

2 Dale v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co., 57 Kan. 601, 47 P. 521 (1897).
'bRomero v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 11 N.M. 679, 72 P. 37 (1903).
16Mallory v. Pioneer Southwestern Stages, 54 F. 2d 559 (1931).
2 See note 13, supra.
IsYoung v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 227 Mo. 307, 127 S.W. 19 (1910).
"Cooper v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S.W. 2d 42

Ibid.
Supra, note 13.
Casey v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 721, 103 S.W. 1146
Louis & S. F. R. R. Co., 130 Mo. App. 368, 109 S.W. 859 (1908).

(1947).

(1907); King v. St.

23 Supra, note 6.

24Peters v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 150 Mo. App. 721, 131 S.W. 917, 923 (1910).
Brownell v. The Pacific R. R. Co., 47 Mo. 239, 243 (1879).
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ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION DESPITE STATUTE?

Although the Missouri decisions would seem to be conclusive
on the question, it might be well to recall that the Colorado statute
does appear, on its face, to create two cases of action, and that
some of the language in the Colorado court's opinion in Denver &
Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick lends itself to such a construction.
I am inclined to conclude, however, that there is but one cause of
action in our hypothetical case.
Some general statements of law have been persuasive in reaching this conclusion. For instance, in an action brought under the
Colorado statute for the death of a railroad employee while engaged in interstate commerce, wherein the Supreme Court of
Colorado held the action should have been brought under the appropriate federal statute, the court said, "The two statutes cover the
same subject, are unlike in substantial respects, and cannot occupy
the same field." 26 A statement by the Missouri court which may
explain this result is as follows

:27

Where there are two statutes and the provisions of one apply
specially to a particular subject, which clearly includes the matter
in question, and the other general in its terms, and such that, if
standing alone, it would include the same matter, and thus conflict
with each other, then the former act must be taken as constituting an
exception, if not a repeal of the latter or general statute.
28

Similarly, a federal court has said,

Where there are two statutes upon the same subject, the earlier
being special and the later general, the presumption is, in the absence
of an express repeal, or an absolute incompatibility, that the special
is intended to remain in force as an exception to the general.

At this writing, two bills have been passed in the Colorado
Legislature, Senate Bill No. 49 and House Bill No. 78. Each of
these increases the maximum allowable under each section of the
statute to $10,000. There is no other change is substance, except
that the Senate Bill deletes the words "and not less than three
thousand dollars" in the present statute, and adds the words,
"deemed just and fair by a jury or court." If this wording should
be construed to make the proposed act compensatory rather than
penal, then the solution to our problem should be much simpler
than it is under the present statutes. However, such a construction is unlikely, since, in Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Frederick,
the court listed at least three other reasons why it felt the statute
is penal rather than compensatory, and there is also the fact that
the proposed statute continues to use the word "forfeit". It seems,
then, the enactment of either of the proposed statutes should
have no effect on Mary Doe's problem, should it arise before the
Supreme Court of Colorado, and she should be held to have only
one cause of action for John Doe's wrongful death.
25Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Wilson, 62 Colo. 492, 494, 163 P. 857, 859 (1917).
27Gilkerson v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 22 Mo. 173, 121 S.W. 138, 148 (1909).
21U. S. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F. 2d 705, 715 (1926).

